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JAMES W. FANNIN, JR., IN THE TEXAS REVOLUTION

RUBY CUMBY SMITH

4. *The Last Days of the Expedition*

Nothing now remains to be told of the Matamoros Expedition except the details of its complete failure. These details make up principally a "hard luck" story, and while they show both the American officers and soldiers to have been brave and generous, they also reveal a carelessness and incompetency, absolutely inexcusable in both. The Americans in every fight proved themselves individually superior to the Mexicans, yet with practically no concert of action in their movements, this individual bravery counted for little. Fannin was careless and apparently knew little of the strategy of retreat. Urrea, on the other hand, was a careful general, but with inferior soldiers accomplished the destruction of the entire American force only because of his superior numbers. Unfortunately, we have no letters written from Goliad during the last days of the expedition except two from John Sowers Brooks (March 9 and March 10), and these serve only to give us a gloomy picture of the determination of the Americans to resist to the end. We have, therefore, to depend for our information of this period on accounts and reminiscences written after the war, and these, in many instances, confuse both incidents and dates. For instance, Bernard's account, which Linn characterizes as the "most correct and competent extant," even though written shortly after the massacre in 1836, is inaccurate in saying that before Ward left Goliad for Refugio on March 12, Fannin had received Houston's order to retreat to Victoria,²⁴ when as a matter of fact, the message was written after dark on March 11,²⁵ and to reach Goliad from Gonzales, the place from which it was written, then took thirty hours.²⁶ Hence it was impossible for Ward to have known of this order on March 12, and it is not likely, though not impossible, that he knew of it on March 13. Again, other accounts examined say that Ward left for Refugio on March 13; so it is

²⁴Linn, John J., *Reminiscences of Fifty Years in Texas*, 150.

²⁵Yoakum, *History of Texas*, II, 473-475.

²⁶Houston in a speech in the United States Senate; Crane, *Life of Houston*, 582; also in Hart's *Contemporaries*, III, 638.

safe to conclude that Bernard was mistaken either as to the date of Ward's departure, or as to the time of the arrival of Houston's message. Linn himself published his *Reminiscences* in 1883 and confuses the date of February 14 with March 14. Thus there are several discrepancies in the accounts which have been left us; yet from a study of these accounts and by a comparison of them with Urrea's *Diario*, published in 1838, we can pretty accurately arrive at the correct conclusions both as to the time and the details of the incidents.

For convenience, let us consider the last days of the expedition under the following heads: (a) the orders to retreat; (b) the division of Fannin's forces; (c) the retreat; (d) the battle of the Coleta; (e) the surrender of Fannin's men; (f) the massacre.

(a) The Orders to Retreat

On March 4, 1836, Houston was elected commander-in-chief of the army of the Republic of Texas, and on March 7, he took the field with the determination of relieving Travis in the Alamo.²⁷ To aid him in this determination, he sent an order from the Colorado by way of Gonzales to Fannin to meet him with all his available forces on the west side of the Cibolo.²⁸ This order went through the hands of Colonel Neill,²⁹ commanding at Gonzales, and it was forwarded to Fannin at Goliad, reaching there on March 11.³⁰ However, on reaching Gonzales and learning of the fall of the Alamo, Houston adopted another course,³¹ and sent the following letter to Fannin:

Headquarters, Gonzales, March 11, 1836.

To Colonel J. W. Fannin, Commanding at Goliad;

Sir: You will as soon as practicable after the receipt of this order, fall back on Guadalupe Victoria, with your command and such artillery as can be brought with expedition. The remainder will be sunk in the river. You will take the necessary measures for the defence of Victoria, and forward one-third the number of

²⁷Brown, *History of Texas*, II, 587.

²⁸Houston to Collingsworth, March 13, 1836; Yoakum, *History of Texas*, II, 473-4.

²⁹Yoakum, *History of Texas*, II, 104.

³⁰Ayres' Journal, *Lamar Papers*.

³¹Houston to Collingsworth, March 13, 1836; Yoakum, *History of Texas*, II, 473.

your effective men to this point, and remain in command until further orders.

Every facility is to be afforded to women and children who may be desirous of leaving that place, Goliad. Previous to abandoning Goliad, you will take the necessary measures to blow up the fortress; and do so before leaving the vicinity. The immediate advance of the enemy will be confidently expected, as well as a rise of water. Prompt movements are, therefore, highly important.

Sam Houston,
Commander-in-chief of the Army.³²

Thus, there were two orders to retreat: (1) the one to relieve Bexar; (2) the one to retire to Victoria. I believe it is the confusing of these orders that has led many people to believe that Fannin refused absolutely to obey General Houston. General Houston himself in a speech in the United States Senate, February 28, 1859, declared that he ordered Fannin to fall back to Victoria and that he received an answer from Fannin stating that he had received Houston's order, had held a council of war, that he had determined to defend the place and called it Fort Defiance, and had taken the responsibility to disobey the order.³³

From a study of the sources, we believe that General Houston himself was confusing the answer to his first order—if Fannin wrote one—as the answer to his second order. That Fannin and his men were anxious to go to the relief of Bexar has already been shown; but they were unwilling to go at the risk of all being murdered on the way and of exposing the whole country between Bexar and the coast to the enemy. Moreover, on March 10, John Sowers Brooks wrote in his last letter from Goliad before Houston's first order could have reached there that it was believed in Goliad that Santa Anna intended to detach 1000 men from Bexar to form a junction with the 650 men in San Patricio and then reduce Goliad.³⁴ With this knowledge in his possession, we believe that if Fannin wrote Houston that he had taken it upon himself to disobey any order, it was this order to march to the relief of Bexar, and not the one to retreat to Victoria.

³²Yoakum, *History of Texas*, II, 472.

³³This speech is copied in part in Hart's *American History Told by Contemporaries*, III, 637-41.

³⁴John Sowers Brooks to A. H. Brooks, March 10, 1836. *THE QUARTERLY*, IX, 194.

Positive evidence that Fannin was attempting to retreat to Victoria may be found in two letters which Fannin wrote from Goliad, but which fell into the hands of Urrea and were translated into Spanish and published in his *Diario* in 1838.³⁵ These show that Fannin was having difficulty in retreating to Victoria, but that he was firm in his resolution to do so. The first of the letters is an order to Colonel A. C. Horton to hasten forward the cattle, horses, and mules to aid him in the retreat. An extract from it re-translated into English reads:

Yours of yesterday received rather late in the afternoon. I wish to inform you that as soon as the party of 200 men under the command of Colonel Ward, which I look for between 9 and 10 tonight, returns, overcoming all difficulties, I shall march to Victoria in compliance with the orders of General Houston. Therefore, if you cannot advance to this point, you will probably overtake me on the way.

The second letter is to Captain Sam A. White at Victoria urging him also to hasten forward the carts, oxen, etc., for the retreat, and ordering that ammunition be sent for the army along the Colorado. An extract from it reads: "The division under the orders of Colonel Ward has not yet arrived, but as quickly as they do, we shall march upon Victoria, which point I shall defend as quickly as possible."

It is hardly possible that Fannin would have written these officers urging them to aid him in his retreat, and at the same time have written General Houston that he refused to do so.

Again, Desauque, the courier who brought the message to Fannin to retreat to Victoria,³⁶ was present at the battle of Coleto, was captured there, and was shot on March 27 along with the other volunteers. It is not likely that Fannin would have sent so important a reply by another messenger, or that Desauque would have returned to Goliad after delivering the message to Houston.

Thus, the evidence examined shows that there were two orders to retreat, one to Bexar and the other to Victoria, and that Fannin, though possibly refusing to obey the first, was using every effort to obey the second.

³⁵Urrea, *Diario*, 57-8.

³⁶Yoakum, *History of Texas*, II, 87.

(b) The Division of Fannin's Forces

With the arrival of the Mexican forces, the Texans, especially those in the exposed areas, began to flee towards the east. Linn tells of his work as alcalde of Victoria, in advising the people of that locality to seek places of safety.³⁷ The army naturally aided in this work. On the evening of March 10,³⁸ because of the personal appeal of Mr. Ayres of Refugio, Captain King with 28 or 30 men was sent from Goliad to Refugio to aid in bringing off some families there. King, on reaching Refugio, however, was confronted by the Mexicans and forced into the Mission, from which place he, nevertheless, managed to send back to Goliad for aid. Colonel Ward with 150 men was at once dispatched to King's relief, leaving on the morning of March 12.³⁹ This was the first of the unfortunate occurrences which led to Fannin's capture; for if Fannin's men had not been divided, his retreat would have been sooner effected, and the men under Ward and King added to Fannin's force at the Coleta might have saved the day for the Americans. Again, Urrea would not have learned so definitely of Fannin's plans, through the captured messages, and would not have made such strenuous efforts to destroy Ward, with whom "Fannin proposed to make himself invincible."

Yet we cannot blame Fannin either for wishing to furnish protection to exposed families, or to help his own men in distress; and if the rest of his retreat could have been accomplished with haste, even after he learned of the disaster to Ward, he might have still escaped to Victoria, if he had managed skillfully. The thing which we can blame Fannin, as well as Ward and King, for was their slowness to execute any movement they undertook.

Ward reached Refugio on the afternoon of March 12 and relieved King. It was possibly his plan to return on the 14th.⁴⁰ Bernard tells that King after being relieved straggled off to

³⁷Linn, John J., *Reminiscences of Fifty Years in Texas*, 247.

³⁸Ayres' Journal, *Lamar Papers*.

³⁹Ayres' Journal, *Lamar Papers*.

Bernard says that Ward left on the morning of March 12, but Brown (*Baker's Texas Scrap Book*, 245) and an unknown writer in Foote (II, 248) says that it was on the 13th. Bernard declares that Ward knew of Houston's order to retreat to Victoria, but this is impossible if Ward left on the 12th.

⁴⁰Inferred from the letter in Urrea's *Diario*, 57.

some ranches where the people had shown hostility.⁴¹ Another account says that King refused to serve under Ward and left.⁴² At any rate, the forces of King and Ward were separated, and thus each became an easy prey for the Mexicans.

Urrea's forces early on the morning of March 14 attacked Ward, who had sought refuge in the mission, but were forced to retire. Later in the day while attempting to dislodge Ward, Urrea was attacked by King's men from the rear.⁴³ Urrea's reserve cavalry then pursued King and his men and succeeded in killing eleven of them and taking seven prisoners.

Finding himself unable to capture Ward during the day, Urrea placed guards around the mission at night to prevent Ward's escape; but almost miraculously, without Urrea's knowledge, the Americans got away, aided as Urrea says by the "darkness of the night, a strong norther, and rain."⁴⁴ They were followed on the 15th. Sixteen were killed that day, and thirty-one made prisoners. The next day fourteen more were captured. About thirty of these prisoners, belonging mainly to King's company, were shot by Urrea's consent on March 16; the others being Mexicans were set free.⁴⁵ The remainder of Ward's men succeeded in reaching Victoria, where on March 22, one hundred of them surrendered to Urrea. These, on March 26, were sent back to Goliad, and on March 27 were shot.

(c) The Retreat from Goliad

Houston's order to retreat to Victoria reached Fannin at Goliad either on the evening of March 13 or the morning of March 14,⁴⁶ and Fannin set about to obey it. The messages to Colonel Horton and to Captain White, written on March 14, expressing a determination to retreat as soon as Ward returned, have already been noted. The message to Horton also says that Fannin was having

⁴¹Confirmed by Ayres' Journal, which says: "King with 15 or 20 men went down to Lopez low ranch to punish some rancheros who were also said to have been plundering."

⁴²Brown, in Baker's *Texas Scrap Book*, 245.

⁴³Urrea's *Diario*, II.

⁴⁴Urrea, *Diario*, 11.

⁴⁵Urrea's *Diario*, 13.

⁴⁶Brown, II, 588, says March 13; Yoakum, II, 87, says March 14. It was written March 11, 1836, between the time Houston received the news of the fall of Bexar (8 or 9 at night) and twelve o'clock, and it took thirty hours for the message to reach Fannin.

difficulties in retreating. What these difficulties were cannot with accuracy be determined; but Linn tells us⁴⁷ that it was because his men declared that they had come for a brush with the Mexicans and feared that by leaving Goliad they would lose the opportunity of having it, and that Fannin was powerless to control them. Other difficulties might have been those attendant upon the dismantling of the fort, the lack of roads between Victoria and Goliad, and the excessive cold.

Fannin, it will be remembered, looked for Ward to return between 9 and 10 o'clock on March 14. Messages were sent him daily, but these were all intercepted by the Mexicans; and nothing was heard from him till 4 p. m. on March 17, when Captain Frazier, sent out as a last resort, returned with the news of the escape of his men from the mission and the murder of King's men. Even now at Frazier's return, if Fannin had been prepared to depart at once, he might have reached Victoria that night, because Urrea had only 70 men, under Captain Ireata, between Victoria and Goliad.⁴⁸ Again Urrea's own troops returning from Refugio were too fatigued to pursue him, and the reinforcements expected from San Antonio, 500 men of the Jimenez and San Luis Batteries, which played a decisive part in the battle of the Coleto, had not yet arrived. Yet Bernard tells us that, though the Americans realized that retreat was necessary, they did not propose to run. This is likely the reason that they were allowed to spend the 18th in useless skirmishing, though, in all probability, it was a part of Urrea's program to annoy the Americans each day till the Mexicans were ready for a final attack. This skirmishing animated the Americans; yet, as Bernard points out,⁴⁹ it was a bad thing for them, for (1) it wasted a day for them; (2) their horses needed for the retreat were tired down by it; and (3) their oxen which had been gotten up for the purpose of drawing the carts remained a whole day without food. The slowness of these teams was one of the disastrous factors for the Americans in the retreat. The skirmishing also inspired the Americans with a false idea of their superiority in arms and gave them a false confidence in their ability to escape from the Mexicans.

⁴⁷Linn, John J., *Reminiscences of Fifty Years in Texas*, 125.

⁴⁸Urrea, *Diario*, 12, 13.

⁴⁹Bernard in Wooten (editor), *A Comprehensive History of Texas*, I, 620.

Nothing more clearly shows the contempt which the Americans held for the Mexicans and the false sense of security possessed by them than do the details of this retreat. Aided by a dense fog, they started on the morning of March 19. Horton, who on March 14 had arrived to assist in the retreat, acted as scout. Having gone a mile past Manahuila Creek, or seven miles from Goliad, the entire party stopped for an hour to graze their oxen and to have breakfast. They had gone perhaps ten miles further on their slow journey when they sighted the Mexicans in their rear.⁵⁰

Meanwhile, Urrea on his part, had doubted that the Americans would retreat, and was preparing to lay siege to the fort. On learning, however, that the Americans had really escaped, he ordered Garay with the artillery and baggage to reconnoitre and occupy the fort, and he himself at 11 o'clock with 370 infantry and 80 cavalry started in pursuit. He got sight of the Americans at 1:30 o'clock.⁵¹

The Americans now halted and shot at the Mexicans, but perceiving that the Mexicans were too far off, they took up their march again. They went perhaps a mile, when in crossing a depression their ammunition cart broke down. They were suddenly cut off by the Mexican cavalry from a wood, one-half a mile distant, which they were trying to reach, and soon found themselves completely surrounded by the enemy.⁵²

(d) The Battle of the Coleta

Fannin now completely surrounded, arranged his men in a hollow square. In the front were placed the Red Rovers and the New Orleans Greys; in the rear Duval's Mustangs, on the sides the other troops. Urrea stationed the Jimenez Battery under Salas in the front, the battery under Nuñez in the rear; Morales and his cazadores at the left, and the San Luis troops at the right. Though Urrea had no artillery, he decided to join battle at once. The American wings were first attacked. Morales led a bayonet charge from the left, but this was repulsed. Then Urrea in person led a cavalry charge from the rear, but was forced to retire. Still a third attack was unsuccessful, and Urrea drew off his troops to await the arrival of the artillery, placing patrols around the Americans.

⁵⁰Wooten (editor), *A Comprehensive History of Texas*, I, 660.

⁵¹Account in Urrea, 14.

⁵²Wooten (editor), *A Comprehensive History of Texas*, I, 621; Urrea, *Diario*, 14.

The battle had lasted from three in the afternoon till dark, and the Americans had fought with great bravery—a fact which Urrea repeatedly mentions in his *Diario*. Of their number seven had been killed and sixty wounded, Fannin⁵³ and John Sowers Brooks being among the number wounded.⁵⁴ The American cavalry had escaped when first overtaken, though some abandoned their horses and went to the aid of their companions. Needless to say, Urrea used their horses with which to mount his soldiers.

Survivors of the massacre picture the night of March 19 as one of great horror. The Americans were without lights, water, or provisions. For the most part they spent the night in digging an entrenchment and placing their carts and the carcasses of their two horses and of several oxen as breastworks. Escape was clearly impossible; the Americans were surrounded by the Mexicans; the night was excessively dark; to have made a dash for liberty would have necessitated their leaving their wounded at the mercy of the Mexicans, and this they would not do.

(e) The Surrender of Fannin's Men

Early next morning Urrea received a fresh supply of ammunition, two pieces of artillery and reinforcements. His number was now about 1300, while the Americans had possibly something over 200 fighting men.⁵⁵ A few rounds from Urrea's artillery and a consideration of their plight caused them to deliberate on the question of surrender. Their own artillery had been of little use the afternoon before; their gunner had been killed; John Sowers Brooks, their chief engineer, had been wounded; and in their low position the artillery could not be used. The Mexican artillery, in a higher position, showed the Americans that only complete annihilation awaited them. They had been brave enough to keep

⁵³Wooten (editor), *A Comprehensive History of Texas*, I, 622.

⁵⁴THE QUARTERLY, IX, 199.

⁵⁵Wooten (editor), *A Comprehensive History of Texas*, I, 622.

This is an estimate by Bernard, and is probably about 350 in excess of the real number of Urrea's men in the battle. Urrea had at this time his own forces of 550 men (*Diario*, 7) besides the 500 reinforcements of the San Luis and Jimenez Battalions from Bexar (*Diario*, 13). He says that he started in pursuit of Fannin with 360 infantry and 80 cavalry, sent back 100 of these, but got 100 reinforcements the next morning. As he used the San Luis and Jimenez Battalions in the battle, he probably means to say that he used these in addition to the 360 infantry and 80 cavalry, making about 950 in all.

the enemy at bay in an open gun duel; but in artillery fighting they realized their inferiority. Also, without food and water, to continue fighting would be only to postpone their fate.

The Americans knew of the treachery of the Mexicans to King's men; but they had a notion that if the terms of surrender were set down in writing, some consideration would be shown the scrap of paper. Hence, the officers urged Fannin to make an honorable capitulation, and only on this consideration was he urged by his officers to treat. Bernard declares that Fannin held out against his officers, and only agreed to raise the white flag when he learned that it was their unanimous wish.⁵⁶

That there was a capitulation all the survivors of the massacre affirm, for they saw the officers writing; but the exact terms were not definitely proved till the original document was found by Professor E. C. Barker a few years ago in Mexico City. The American survivors had almost unanimously declared the terms to be something as follows:

1. That they should lay down their arms and surrender as prisoners of war and be treated according to the usage of civilized nations.
2. That their wounded should be taken back to Goliad and be properly attended to.
3. That all private rights should be respected.

The real terms of surrender as published in Urrea's *Diario* in 1838,⁵⁷ and confirmed by the original in the Mexican Archives, are as follows:

Art. 1st. The Mexican troops having placed their artillery at a distance of one hundred and seventy paces and having opened fire, we raised a white flag and at once Colonels Juan Morales and Mariano Salas came in company with Lieutenant Colonel Juan Jose Holsinger of the Engineers, and we proposed to them to surrender ourselves at discretion, to which they agreed.

Art. 2nd. That the wounded and their commander Fannin should be treated with all the consideration possible, since we propose to surrender all our arms.

Art. 3d. All the detachment shall be treated as prisoners of war and placed at the disposal of the Supreme Government.

Camp on the Coleta between Guadalupe and La Bahia. March 20, 1836.

⁵⁶Wooten (editor), *A Comprehensive History of Texas*, I, 623.

⁵⁷Urrea, *Diario*, 58.

B. C. Wallace, (Major), J. M. Chadwick, (Adjutant. Approved, J. W. Fannin, (Commander).

[Added by Urrea]: When the white flag was raised by the enemy, I ordered their leader to be informed that I could have no other agreement than that they should surrender at discretion, without any other condition, and this was agreed to by the persons stated above; the other petitions which the subscribers of this surrender make will not be granted. I told them this, and they agreed to it, for I must not, nor can I, grant anything else.

This, then, means that the Americans surrendered at discretion and placed themselves at the disposal of the supreme government. The government had decreed that foreigners taken with arms in their hands were to be regarded as pirates and executed. Santa Anna had warned Urrea that he should comply with this law.⁵⁸ It is not likely that Fannin was ignorant of this law, and certainly Urrea could make no treaty except under it.⁵⁹ Urrea declared that the Americans surrendered in full confidence that Mexican generosity would not make their sacrifice fruitless; otherwise, they would have resisted and sold their lives as dearly as possible. Holsinger⁶⁰ confirms Urrea's statement that he promised that he would use his influence with the supreme government to have the law set aside in the case of the Americans, and declares that the Americans were assured by the commissioners sent by Urrea that the Mexican government had never ordered a man shot who had trusted to its clemency.

(f) The Goliad Massacre

By March 22, all the Americans⁶¹ had been removed from the battlefield to Goliad; on the 24th, Major Miller with 80 men from Nashville, who had been captured on landing at Copano, was taken there;⁶² and on the 26th, Ward with 80 of his men had been sent in from Victoria. On March 26, also, Urrea, who was now in

⁵⁸Urrea, *Diario*, 54-5.

⁵⁹Urrea, *Diario*, 22.

⁶⁰Holsinger to Wharton, June 3, 1836. Urrea, *Diario*, 129-31. An English translation of this letter, made by Edward Gritten, is in the *Lamar Papers*.

Holsinger was a German, but was in command of the engineers in Urrea's army. He was one of the commissioners sent by Urrea to arrange the terms of surrender. Later he superintended the receiving of the arms from the Americans.

⁶¹The number was 234. Urrea, *Diario*, 61.

⁶²Urrea, *Diario*, 61.

Victoria, wrote Portilla, whom he had left in command of Goliad, to treat the prisoners with consideration, and to employ them in repairing houses and erecting quarters. On the same day, also, Portilla received orders from Santa Anna to have all the prisoners who had surrendered by force of arms to be shot, and gave instructions as to how to proceed about it.⁶³

Portilla vacillated all night between these orders, but at daybreak on March 27, he determined to obey Santa Anna's order, since it was superior to Urrea's. His account of how he did this is brutal in its conciseness: he gave orders to awaken the prisoners; had Colonel Miller's company separated from the rest; placed the prisoners in three divisions under Alcerrica, Balderas, and Ramirez, who had orders to shoot them. Then he sent an official account of the affair to Santa Anna; also a letter to Urrea, protesting against receiving orders as a public executioner, and complaining that he and his Indians were doubtless left at Goliad for the purpose of carrying into effect the schemes Urrea had in view.⁶⁴

Fannin, on account of his wound, was not marched out with the other Americans. He was unmoved when he heard that he was to be killed, but requested that he might not be shot in the head and that he might be decently buried. Both these requests were denied him: he was shot in the head, and his body was placed with the others and burned.⁶⁵

That Santa Anna alone was to blame for this horrible massacre is a well established fact. As head of the government, he was responsible for the passing of the law that foreigners taken with arms in their hands were to be executed.⁶⁶ He attempted to justify himself by declaring that the prisoners were very embarrassing to the commandant at Goliad; that before they had retreated they had set fire to the place, and that nothing was left but the church in which to house the Mexican sick and wounded; that the prisoners greatly outnumbered the garrison, and had constantly to be watched; that the Mexicans were poorly supplied with provisions;

⁶³This account of the massacre at Goliad is taken principally from Urrea, *Diario*, 61-2.

⁶⁴Urrea, *Diario*, 62-3.

⁶⁵Bernard in Wooten (editor), *A Comprehensive History of Texas*, 627.

⁶⁶The Law of December 30, 1835. This was a war measure, passed at the outbreak of hostilities, in view of the preparations carried on in various parts of the United States to enlist volunteers for the Texan cause.—Bancroft, *North Mexican States and Texas*, I, 234.

and that they were without cavalry to transport the prisoners to Matamoras.⁶⁷

Colonel Juan José Holsinger, in his letter to John A. Wharton⁶⁸ would have us believe that Urrea did not intercede for Fannin's men, or at least that he did not inform Santa Anna of his personal promises to Fannin. Urrea vigorously denies this, and cites as proof the statement of Caro, in *Verdadera Idea*,⁶⁹ that when Urrea wrote Santa Anna recommending that mercy be shown the Americans, he received a vigorous reprimand, in which Santa Anna expressed displeasure that Urrea should stain his triumph by a badly misunderstood compassion. Urrea also shows that, if we consider the circumstances⁷⁰ under which Holsinger wrote this letter, we will understand that it was simply to save Santa Anna's life that he wrote it.

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⁶⁷Extract from the Manifesto of Santa Anna, published in Yoakum, *History of Texas*, II, 521-22.

⁶⁸Holsinger to Wharton, Urrea, *Diario*, 129-31.

⁶⁹Caro, *Verdadera Idea*, 13.

⁷⁰At Quintana, when the Texans were demanding that Santa Anna be delivered over to them.

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